European Studies Institute at MGIMO-University

[1] European Practices of Regulation of PMSCs and Recommendations for Regulation of PMSCs through International Legal Instruments // Anne-Marie Buzatu. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). – Geneva, 30 September 2008. – 59 p.

 

[2] UN General Assembly Doc. A/63/325 Report on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination. – 25 August 2008. – P. 7.

 

[3] See, e.g.: Schmeidl Susanne. Case Study Afghanistan – Who Guards the Guardians? / Private Security Companies and Local Population: An Exploratory Study of Afghanistan and Angola. Swisspeace report, November 2007. – P. 14 – 45; Brooking Stephen, Schmeidl Susanne. When Nobody Guards the Guards: The Quest to Regulate Private Security Companies in Afghanistan // Sicherheit und Frieden, Vol. 4, fall 2008.

 

[4] Accountability for Private Military and Security Companies // Amnesty International Human Rights Elections Brief 2008, No. 9, 2008. – P. 1.

 

[5] UN General Assembly Doc. A/63/325. – P. 7.

 

[6] 31 USC 501.

 

[7] Afghanistan, for example, as is mentioned in the report, responded to this situation by imposing an age limit of 25 for Afghan nationals to join private security firms, and is considering raising the limit to 30.

 

[8] Richards Anna, Smith Henry. Addressing the Role of Private Security Companies within Security Sector Reform Programmes // Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol. 5, No. 1, May 2007.

 

[9] Some experts think that it is the main reason for PMSCs proliferation.

 

[10] Private Military Companies // Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF Backgrounder, No. 4, 2006.

 

[11] Born H., Caparini M., Cole E. Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects // DCAF Policy Paper, No. 20, 2007. – P. 10. – Available at www.dcaf.ch. It is a reprint of the Council of Europe Council of Police Matters of the European Committee on Crime Problem draft report, Report No. PC-PM, 2006, 01, Strasbourg, 11 September 2006.

 

[12] European Practices… - P. 11.

 

[13] European Practices… - P. 17.

 

[14] Born Hans, Caparini Marina, Cole Eden. – Ibid.

 

[15] This information is based on "Panoramic Overview of Private Security Industry in 25 MS of the EU", CoESS and Uni-Europa, 2004.

 

[16] Recent US John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007 extends military codes to PMSCs and brings them potentially under the jurisdiction of locally-based military courts.

 

[17] Lanigan Kevin. Legal Regulation of PMSCs in the United States: The Gap between Law and Practice // Sicherheit und Frieden, fall 2008. – P. 4.

 

[18] Razook Erica. Online-debate on Private Security Contractors // Council on Foreign Relations, 13 December 2007. – http://www.cfr.org

 

[19] Available at the ICRC website at http://icrc.org

 

[20] How is the Term "Armed conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law? // ICRC Opinion Paper, March 2008.

 

[21] Jose L. Gomez Del Prado writes: "These new modalities have absorbed the use of traditional individual mercenaries… Recruited in their respective countries from all over the world as "private security guards" to provide protection, most of them have in fact taken part in internal low-intensity armed conflicts. Most of them are not members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict and they have not been officially sent by their respective States. All of them have been essentially motivated by private gain. Although these are characteristics of the mercenary-related activities and modalities of the conflicts of the twenty-first century, they are in fact, extremely difficult to prove. These situations together with the loopholes in international law permit PMSC to operate in a grey zone". – Del Prado J.L.G. Impact on Human Rights of Private Military and Security Companies’ Activities // Global Research, October 11, 2008. – P. 2. – http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10523

 

[23] It was adopted by the resolution of the UN General Assembly. As in case of Article 47 its mission was to nip in the bud the growing phenomenon of Western governments hiring mercenaries to suppress national liberation movements. Here lies the explanation why it is largely boycotted by them and inter alia by those states which are interested in PMSCs proliferation.

 

[24] Cameron Lindsey. Private Military Companies: Their Status under International Humanitarian Law and Its Impact on Their Regulation // International Review of the Red Cross, No. 863, 2006. – P. 573 – 598. There is even a well known saying belonging to G. Best. In his historical book "Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts", published in 1980, he wrote: "any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot – and his lawyer with him!" (P. 383).

 

[25] European Practices… - P. 24.

 

[26] Its overview is available at http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc. See as well: Brooks Doug. The Swiss Show Some Initiative // Journal of International Peace Operations, Vol. 3, No. 6, May-June 2008.

 

[27] For its summary see, e.g.: Perret Antoine. Latin-America Experience and Lessons for Regulation. Draft Report for the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries. – Bogotá, 1 October 2008. – P. 31 – 38.

 

[28] European Practices… - P. 25.

 

[29] Ibid. – P. 49.

 

[30] Ibid. – P. 3, 41 – 47.

 

[31] See: Report No. PC-PM, 2006, 01, Strasbourg, 11 September 2006.

 

[32] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 4986, passed in the U.S. Congress House of Representatives, January 16, 2008, passed in the Senate, January 22, 2008, signed by the President, January 28, 2008.

 

[33] Draft International Convention on Private Military and Security Companies. – Moscow, 10 October 2008. – 12 p.

 

[34] The Working Group was established in July 2005 pursuant to the former Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/2. It is mandated, inter alia, to monitor mercenaries and mercenary-related activities in all their forms and manifestations in different parts of the world and to study the effects of the activities of private companies offering military assistance, consultancy and security services on the international market on the enjoyment of human rights.

 

[35] UN General Assembly Doc. A/63/325. – P. 16.

 

[36] See: Perret Antoine. Op. cit. – 38 p.; Саунина Е.В. Междунарощные военные конфликты [Saunina E.V. International Military Conflicts. – Original Russian]; Валецкий Олег Витальевич. Частные военные компании, их создание и развитие. Опыт работы в Ираке и других регионах мира. Влияние боевых действий в Ираке на их деятельность. Положение в Сербии и России [Valetzkyi O.V. Private Military Companies, their Creation and Development. Experience Gained in Iraq and other Regions of the World. Influence of Military Operations in Iraq on their Activities. Situation in Serbia and Russia. – Original Russian]; Приватизация войны (Частные военные компании, их создание, развитие и опыт работы в Ираке и других регионах мира). Статья Олега Валецкого с предисловием и примечаниями Веремеева Ю.Г. [Privatization of War (Private Military Companies, their Creation, Development and Working Experience in Iraq and other Regions of the World). Article by Oleg Valetzkyi with introduction and comments by Veremeev U.G.].

 

[37] In fiscal year 2001 Blackwater had $736,906 in federal contracts, in 2002 - $3,415,884, in 2003 - $25,395,556, in 2004 – 48,496,903, in 2005 - $352,871,817, in 2006 - $596,601,952. See: Memorandum, October 1, 2007, to Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the Congress of the United States House of Representatives from Majority Staff on Additional Information about Blackwater USA. – P. 3 – 4.

 

[38] Chairman Waxman’s Opening Statement // U.S. House of Representative Hearing on Private Security Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tuesday, October 02, 2007. – P. 1. – http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1511

 

[39] Ibid. – P. 4.

 

[40] Ibid. – P. 4 – 5.

 

[41] Ibid. – P. 5 – 6.

 

[42] See: Perret A. – Op. cit. – P. 16. The author cites examples of the company "Triple Canopy" subcontracting for the benefit of the US State Department services of "3D Global Solutions" which in its turn subcontracted "Gesegur SAC", "Gun Supply SA", "G4S Wackenhut Peru SA", "Defion International SA" or "Red Tactica Inc." recruiting former Chilean military and police personnel to work for Blackwater.

 

[43] Or on the contrary on contras side like in Nicaragua. – See: Gomez I., Paez A., Reyes L., Rodrigues F., Peterson L. y otros. Colombia: Outsourcing War. – Washington: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 2001.

 

[44] Perret A. - Op. cit. – P. 18.

 

[45] Ibidem.

 

[46] See: Veilette C. Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance. – Washington: Congressional Research Service & the Library of Congress, 2005; Perret A. – Op. cit. – P. 23 – 26.

 

[47] Ibid. – P. 19 – 23.

 

[48] See: Singer P.W. Corporate Warriors, the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. – Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2003. – P. 148; Perret A. – Op. cit. – P. 28.

 

[49] Chairman Waxman’s Opening Statement. – Op. cit. – P. 2.

 

[50] "Using Blackwater instead of U.S. troops to protect embassy officials, - says one of the U.S. Congress documents, - is expensive. Blackwater charges the government $ I, 222 per day for the services of a private military contractor. This is equivalent to $445,000 per year, over six times more than the cost of an equivalent U.S. soldier". - See: Memorandum, October 1, 2007, to Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the Congress of the United States House of Representatives from Majority Staff on Additional Information about Blackwater USA. – P. 3

 

[51] U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates relatively recently testified: "[M]y personal concern about some of these security contracts is that I worry that sometimes the salaries that they are able to pay in fact lure some of our soldiers out of the service to go to work for them". That is why he had asked Pentagon officials to work towards including "non-compete clauses" in military contracts in order to "put some limits on the ability of these contractors to lure highly trained soldiers out of our forces and to work for them". – Testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates. Hearing of the Senate Committee on Appropriations: the President’s FY 2008 Supplemental Request for the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, September 26, 2007.

 

[52] See: Memorandum, October 1, 2007, to Members of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the Congress of the United States House of Representatives from Majority Staff on Additional Information about Blackwater USA. – P. 1. For more detailed description of Blackwater’s escalation of force incidents see: Ibid. – P. 6 – 8.

 

[53] Ibid. – P. 2.

 

[54] Chairman Waxman’s Opening Statement. – Op. cit. – P. 2.

 

[55] Private Military Contractors in Iraq: An Examination of Blackwater’s Actions in Fallujah. Prepared by Majority Staff for U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Chairman Henry A. Waxman, September 2007. – P. 4.

 

[56] Chairman Waxman’s Opening Statement. – Op. cit. – P. 2. For more detailed description of the State Department response to the "Christmas Eve shooting" and other cases see: Ibid. – P. 9 – 12.

 

[57] Ibid. – P. 13.

 

[58] Chairman Waxman’s Opening Statement. – Op. cit. – P. 2.

 

[59] Accountability for Private Military and Security Companies // Amnesty International Human Rights Elections Brief 2008, No. 9, 2008. – P. 1.

 

[60] Dickinson L.A. "Status of Forces Agreements and UN Mandates: What Authorities and Protections Do They Provide to U. S. Personnel". Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Relations // U.S. House of Representatives Hearings. – Washington, Thursday, February 28, 2008. – P. 2.

 

[61] Ibidem.

 

[62] It’s an extract from Paragraph (g) of Article 3 of the Definition of Aggression, annexed to the United Nation General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) – 14 December 1974. This provision may be read in conjunction with Article 2, establishing that "the First use of armed forces by a State in contravention of the [UN] Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression".

 

[63] Accountability for Private Military and Security Companies // Amnesty International Human Rights Elections Brief 2008, No. 9, 2008. – P. 2.

 

[64] Del Prado Jose L. Gomez, Maffai Margaret and others. Wisconsin International Law Society (WILS) Model Law Project // WILS paper, 10 October 2008. – P. 2.

 

[65] Draft International Convention on Private Military and Security Companies. – Moscow, 10 October 2008. – P. 2.

 

[66] Ibid. – P. 5.

 

[67] Ibid. – P. 8.

 

[68] In accordance with the WILS Model Law Project preliminary report, suggested prohibited activities fundamentally inappropriate for outsourcing to PMSCs are, but not limited to: conduct of and involvement in military operations, dangerous military support activities, use of weapons and explosives except in training and defensive purposes, military counseling, advising, training, and providing and processing intelligence, interrogation of suspects and prisoners. - Del Prado Jose L. Gomez, Maffai Margaret and others. Op. cit. – P. 9 – 11.