The “Grand Armee” and typhus

Historians from different countries evaluated the defeat of Napoleon in his Russian campaign in different ways. Some of them(mostly, Russian historians themselves) sang patriotic Russian soldiers who defended their home until the last moment, and passed Moscow to the enemy only as the smoldering remains of what used to be capital of Russian Empire. For the Russians, the war with Napoleon was an event of historical importance, which is permanently entrenched in the roots of national pride, and was even praised by the great Russian writer Leo Tolstoy in his multi-volume work "War and Peace". Other historians tend to believe that six hundred thousandth army of Napoleon was the most powerful, modern and well-trained army in the world at that time, and that the Russian Empire did not have even some close military capability to the French, and then in addition to the valor of the soldiers and the talent of commanders, there was something else on the battlefield that finally tip the scales in favor of the Russians. Thus, Napoleon's defeat is attributed to the General Frost, or the lack of winter hooves for the French horses, as well as the terrible quality of Russian roads, where the French convoys with provisions could not ride through (which is believable, given the quality of Russian roads even today). Undoubtedly, the versions of both sides carry a particle of truth, and have the right to exist.

Quiet recently, a new piece of the puzzle has been brought to the light in 2001. In Lithuania, near the City of Vilnius workers were dismantling of the old military barracks left over from the Soviet Union. In the process of dismantling the remains of human bones were found buried in a bed of honor - a mass burial of soldiers peculiar to almost any wartime.(Douglas, S. p. 48) Preliminary, the newly-found grave was considered as the remains of the Jews killed during the Second World War on the territory of Lithuania: as it is known, in Lithuanian Nazi collaboration led to the death of 165 thousand to 254 thousand Jews, and it is hard to tell whether all of the Jewish mass graves were found so far, or not.(Bubnys, A. p.218) However, when Lithuanian archaeologists arrived to the place, the primal version was confirmed, but there was found an evidence that the mass grave belonged to the solders of the Grand Armée of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, which invaded Russia in 1812. In particular, there were two buttons with numbers “61” and “29” stamped on them(presumably, these are numbers of the French Line Regiments, where “61” was the number of the division that preferably consisted of Dutch solders, and 21 is for Loison’s reserve division that tried to salvage what it could of Napoleon’s wrecked army), a patch of a blue uniform cloth, a French Imperial infantry shako(specific military cap, peculiar to army uniform of the 19^th century), and a Napoleonic 20 franc gold coin found among the bones in the grave.(Douglas, S. p. 48) However, subsequent analysis of the bones led the Lithuanian and French archaeologists (who worked together on the excavations, since the identification of nationality of the buried soldiers) to the discovery, which allowed to lift the veil of mystery hanging over the missing army of Napoleon. New studies of the teeth excavated from the grave have led to an interesting and unexpected conclusion that may help explain the fatigue and weakness that resulted in death for so many solders of the French army. It was not just exposure to extreme cold or the difficulties of the attack and the followed retreat, and not even "scorched earth'' tactic used by the Russians, but also disease caused by lice and the bacteria they carry. Thus, by 2006 it became known that at least one-third of those solders found in the Vilnius mass grave died from typhus, as well

as the result of environmental conditions. (Ibid, p. 51)

The Grande Armée of Napoleon did not know defeats for nearly 20 years since its creation. Largely due to the military victories of Napoleon's empire covered a tangible part of Europe, extending eastward from France to the borders of the Russian Empire and Austria, while its the North, East and West was surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.(Sherman, I. p. 118) And if there was no a land army comparable to Napoleon’s one, then the sea was reigned by France’s L'ennemi principal – the Great Britain. British economy was on the rise, due to the success of the industrial revolution. At the same time, the industrial revolution in France had its own characteristics and peculiarities. The democratic revolution of 1789-1794 impacted negatively on the economic development of the country. Despite the proclaimed liberty, the economic chaos and disorganization reigned in the country for a long time. But the most desirable for France (in the person of Napoleon) were the trade routes with India, which at that time was a British colony. However, this dream remained elusive because of the English naval dominance. Attack the English was not possible: Intercept Indian ships made no sense, because they were guarded by convoy ships of the British, as well as it was not possible to invade England, as it is separated from the France by the English Channel, which Napoleon's army could not cross anyhow. The only thing left to Napoleon was to reach India by land, which would have had to cross a good part of the continent. Thus, the only thing left is Napoleon to reach India by land, which would have had to cross a good part of the continent. However, Napoleon's ambitions and the desire to discourage the English conquering India were great, and the beginning of the campaign was a matter of time.(Sherman, I. p. 119)

Bonaparte’s army consisted of approximately 600,000 well-trained and armed soldiers, and 1100 canons, whereas Russian military forces had less than 250000 people.(Ibid, 119) In addition to military units, the Grand Armee consisted of some of the best and most experienced military doctors in Europe. Like any good commander, Napoleon knew that the fighting capacity of army personnel depends primarily on its men's health. During the campaign, Napoleon established many large field hospitals in the rear areas to care for the sick and wounded that were to come in the war ahead.

However, Napoleon overestimated his army's ability to conduct combat operations in the conditions of the Russian winter. Despite the fact that Napoleon's advisers told that the army needs better ammunition, suitable for Russian cold weather, Napoleon insisted that the Russian winter is not very different from the French, to which his army soldiers have become accustomed, and that Grand Army is indestructible by anything.(Conlon, J. p.11) In support of his argument, Napoleon observed that an invasion of Russia will take its place not during the winter, but in the spring time. It is obvious that Napoleon never fought on Russian premises before the war of 1812, as little did he know that there is almost no difference between winter and spring weather in Russia. Another fatal mistake of Napoleon can be considered his desire to carry out his army through the territory of Poland, which was a part of the Russian Empire at the rime. Despite the fact that Prussia and Austria were de facto allies of France, and even gave Napoleon a number of soldiers(as they were obliged to do), he decided to lead his army through Poland. Napoleon planned to return Poland its status of an independent state after defeating the Russians, so he probably was expecting a certain level of collaboration among the polish citizens, as in the eyes of the local population Napoleon's army was to appear as liberators from the yoke of Russian occupants.

First problems begun to appear as soon as Napoleon's army crossed the Neman river. While in Western Europe the sanitary conditions have started to come to its modern type, in the East, particularly in Poland, the life of people was comparable to the terms of the 15th century. Most of the people lived in villages, providing food by agricultural labor. The dirt, parasites and diseases were an integral part of the then village existence, and the first reforms regarding health standards in Poland were taken place only after the war of 1812, when the Russian Emperor Alexander the First took up the reorganization of the Polish lands. After a relatively comfortable movement in Germany, the living conditions in Poland shocked the French Emperor to the very core. Social and living conditions were terrible, especially in comparison with Western Europe. Poland of that time may be described as a compilation of dirty backward villages and underdeveloped cities, where an impression of poverty, wretchedness, and slavishness of the people were the dominant powers. (Zinsser, H. p. 161) Also, the conditions of transportation were not suitable for such a huge army as the army of Napoleon was: The Polish roads were of poor quality, and initially were not built to withstand the heavy guns, and the heavy supply wagons used to support the army. As a result, the main part of the army was moving with an advance, and the carts with supplies and medicines could not keep up with the main forces. This factor is an obvious tactical error, since the army was cut off from the qualitative food and medical support, being surrounded by unsanitary conditions of Eastern Europe. However, Napoleon was in a hurry and wanted to get to the premises of the Russian Empire as soon as possible, and therefore did not pay due attention to the advises of his military commander, and the chief surgeon, even though they were reasonable. Typhus was not something new and unknown to the doctors of the 19th century, and was known by many names, such as nervous fever, spotted fever, exanthematic typhus, putrid fever, febris pestilence, and many more. Despite the reluctance of Napoleon to listen to his medical advicers, the events of 1812-1813 had a positive effect on the further development of medicine in general, as an event of such magnitude as the death of half a million soldiers from the disease attracted the attention of the scientific community, and a lot of works aimed at the study of typhus were released in subsequent years.(The British Medical Journal, p. 955)

Also, Napoleon was warned that among the Polish population typhus is common, and therefore the entire staff of the army was forbidden to contact with the local Polish population under the penalty of military tribunal and the death penalty. (Conlon, J. p.11) However, given the huge size of Napoleon's army, as well as its multi-ethnic composition, where non-French members were unlikely to have an excessive level of loyalty towards the French emperor, it seemed impossible to monitor the contacts with the locals. All the factors described above led to an interesting chain of interdependent events: in the absence of carts with food and supplies, that were delayed by the poor road conditions, as well as by non-rational decision-making, the soldiers were forced to violate a direct orders of their warlords to not starve to death, and raid to nearby villages in search for food. Obviously, such contacts with the Polish peasant population could not but lead to infection of at least one soldier, which in wartime would be enough to infect a good half of the regiment. But given the enormous number of soldiers in Napoleon's army, we can assume that the amount of the originally infected solders was much more than one. The soldiers sent to the villages to loot were bringing back not only the nutrition, but also the lice that were successfully transferring typhus from one soldier to another.

As early as during the first month since the beginning of the epidemic, the French army lost about 80000 of its soldiers. The situation was exacerbated by abnormally hot summer in Poland, which has caused a significant reduction in water reserves, therefore, the French had to spend less on laundry and washing, which further contributed to the spread of typhus among soldiers.(Conlon, J. p.11) Also, we should take into account the increase in sweating during hot weather, which leads to a rapid contamination of a body and clothing. In circumstances where it is impossible to wash, a person begins to actively itch and scratch himself, that is an ideal condition for lice feces to enter the blood flow and cause typhus.

It would seem that where much worse, but after an abnormally hot summer in Poland, an abnormally cold winter came over, forcing the French soldiers to gather together for warmth at night, facilitating the spread of typhus among themselves.(Ibid, p. 12)

However, troubles that the French Army faced in Poland were not over. Russian military leaders were aware of the impending Bonaparte's army, and that the number of Frenchmen exceeded the number of Russian soldiers in twice. The road to Moscow laid not close, so it was decided to harass the soldiers of Napoleon, and delay the direct military confrontation for as long as possible. Later on, when Napoleon reached the territory of Lithuania, the problems of his army just worsened. Retreating deep into Russia, the military of the Russian Emperor Alexander I tried in every way to annoy Napoleon, who was marching behind them. They were destroying roads, which were already poor, felling trees in forests that French horses and carts could not pass through, burning towns and villages, as well as the fields of wheat, and basically abolishing everything that could help Napoleon's soldiers to survive.(Zinsser, H. p. 162) Needless to say that the lack of shelter and massive hunger have caused a severe blow to the immune systems of the French soldiers, that in its turn increased the chances of death from typhus. Such conditions affected adversily the combat capability of the soldiers, as well as their activity: during the period from March to August most of Bonaparte's army was able to overcome just about 160 kilometers, while it was still more than 300 until Moscow.(Sherman, I. p. 120) By the time when the two armies met in the biggest battle of the war (Borodino), there were only one hundred and sixty thousand people left from original six hundredth thousand French army. Later on, about 90000 Frenchmen made it to Moscow, although Napoleon lost only about 30000 people dead during the battle.(Sherman, I. p. 120)

Theoretically, the capture of the capital meant losing the war, and recognition of the surrender. But practically, the capture of Moscow did not bring victory to Napoleon, as the remnants of the Russian army, along with most part of Moscow residents fled the city and moved further into Russian premises, not forgetting to set it on fire before leaving. Napoleon stood in Moscow for some time, while losing about another 10,000 soldiers as a result of diseases(mostly typhus and dysentery) and wounds. The French stay in Moscow was also largely exacerbated by partisan attacks, that were occurring quiet often, since a part of the city’s population remained on its land. As the Russian surrender never happened, it was decided to retreat back, towards Poland. Later, in November the first snow fell. The sharp cooling of a negative impact on the French army remnants, and added the common cases pneumonia to the symptoms of typhus.(Ibid, 120) However, the cold continued to grow, it would seem, was to weaken the ardor of lice that can not tolerate the cold, but the warmth of the human body compensates for the cold air outside, thus the lice have not really felt the change in the weather. But the French army felt those changes in weather much, which coupled with a lack of supplies led to even greater losses in the ranks of the army. Despite that on the way back Napoleon "picked up" his reserves from the occupied cities, typhus and bad weather conditions have done their job, and even soldiers that miraculously recovered in the reserve were vulnerable to get infected again. As a result, there were just about 3000 sick and tired man coming back home, instead of an army of 600000 man, that left France by six months earlier.(Zinsser, H. p.164)

 

Conclucion

 

 

Summarizing, typhus has played a significant role in the defeat of Napoleon in the war of 1812, almost completely destroying (both directly and indirectly) the most powerful army in the world.

However, the epidemic typhus in the French army was the result of Napoleon's arrogant and irrational control. Napoleon was aware of the possibility of an epidemic in advance, and yet hurried forward, without waiting for the support squads. Such actions have caused a famine in the army, which led to raids on nearby villages in search of food, which eventually led to the infection of soldiers. And despite the existence of a direct order prohibiting contact with the local population, it was impossible to control completely such a vast and multi-ethnic army in the conditions of the year 1812. Thus, Napoleon's army like a colossus on legs of clay collapsed under its own weight.

Of course, such an outcome could have been avoided. If Napoleon did not rush so zealously towards the desired India, and spent some time improving the sanitary conditions in Poland, where he was about to grant independence anyways. Also, it was necessary to spend more time in preparation for the attack, stock up warm clothing, to scout the terrain on which the Army is going to go to the goal, and many other details that were undoubtedly were possible to handle for Napoleon's military genius. Thus, typhus killed the strongest army in the world of the 19th century, revealing the result of inefficient management of the army by the French emperor himself. Also, it is difficult to say whether the War of 1812 really caused any particular changes in the healthcare system. In fact, it was still not known how does typhus spread and occur, thus it was not possible to effectively fight against it. Typhus remained a common disease on the battle field for about a hundred years more, since the time of the war described in this paper.

 

Bibliography

 

 

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