AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY
On the average there are up to 35-40 acts of unlawful interference in the world aviation activities every year. Some 70% of them are unlawful seizures, the rest are in-flight attacks, attacks on ground facilities, and unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation.
ICAO is developing an aviation security training program composed of series of standardized training packages designed for global application. The first such package, designed for airport security personnel, has been distributed to all contracting states and relevant international organizations. The further standardized training packages address aviation security management, aviation cargo and mail security, airline security training programmes, and aviation security instructors.
The next major challenge facing aviation security professional is the deployment of the explosives detection system (EDS) to combat the current terrorist threat of aircraft bombings. The first new technology in the aviation security field since the introduction of metal detectors and X-ray systems, the EDS is aimed at screening 100 per cent of aircraft hold luggage. The goal is to reduce the risk of aircraft bombings in the same manner that metal detectors have helped prevent hijackings.
The explosives detection system is the total security system that prevents explosive devices from boarding aircraft. Security professionals are concerned with its ability to keep aircraft safe from bombings, while airports and airlines are concerned that its production may disrupt their timetables and operations. Explosives are likely to be well concealed among the usual items that passengers pack, and it takes a lot of time to detect them.
The subject of aviation security is safeguarding of civil aviation against all acts of unlawful interference. Ineffective implementation of aviation security rules can have a horrendous impact on airlines.
Should a serious incident occur, a 30 to 40 percent drop in passengers can be expected. For States that have a high level of economic dependency upon tourism, the resulting loss of income can be extremely serious.
The management system needs to be based on the aim of achieving a high level of confidence that the security program is being properly implemented at every level of the organization, for every flight departure. Responsibility for security implementation must be delegated to everyone, from the chief executive at headquarters to the baggage handler at the ramp.
The final key to achieving confidence in the effectiveness of a security program is periodic independent monitoring checks or spot checks. Ideally, these checks are carried out by someone with an independent responsibility who reports the results directly to top management.
CONTROLLER PROFICIENCY
ATC requires the performance of many different tasks using the same information or different selections from the information presented. When displays, controls and workspaces are specified, it is therefore important that they be suitable for the whole range of tasks for which they will be employed, and not merely for some of them. As a consequence, they may not be optimum for any, single function but must be efficient and safe for every function. Otherwise certain functions in the operational system may be very inefficient or impossible. For example, any visual coding such as colour is likely to tasks with which it is directly compatible but hinder tasks which require the collation of information portrayed in different colours. A balance has to be struck across the various tasks, to choose codlings that help as many tasks as possible and do not seriously interfere with any task.
The controller must be able to plan the air the air traffic control, implement the plans, make decisions, solve problems and formulate predictions. To perform the essential control tasks, the controller must understand the portrayed information, whatever form it takes. The controller must remember what forms of assistance are available and know when it is appropriate to call on each. The controller must know the right course of action in all circumstances. Human Factors addresses the thinking processes that the controller must follow and the effects of equipment changes on them. If necessary, equipment or procedures must be modified to ensure that these thinking processes do not change too much or too quickly. Whenever these thinking processes must change, appropriate controller retraining is essential. This often involves revised liveware-software links.
The controller must be able to understand and assign priorities to the relevant information, to plan ahead, to make timely and appropriate decisions, to implement them and to ensure compliance with them.
The proficient controller needs to know and understand:
n how ATC is conducted;
n the meaning of all presented information;
n the tasks to be accomplished;
n the applicable rules, procedures and instruction;
n the forms and methods of communication within the system;
n how and when to use each tool provided within the workspace;
n Human Factors considerations applicable to ATC;
n the ways in which responsibility for an aircraft is accepted and handed over from one controller to the next;
n the ways in which the work of various controllers harmonizes so that they rather than impede each other;
n what changes or signs could denote system degradations or failures;
n aircraft performance characteristics and preferred maneuvering;
n other influences on flight and routes, such as weather, restricted airspace, noise abatement, etc.