Searching for an Adequate Reaction
The Islamic rise in the Volga region is a deeply complex phenomenon. It has been driven by the re-sults of internal socio-political and religious dynamics, by religious globalization, and by the pen-etration of radicals into new territories. Islamism, as well as nono_cial Islam, is far from homo-geneous; the degree of radicalism among the adherents of different groups varies widely. Each of these groups has a different set of motives and rationales for their dissatisfaction with the current government, and “traditional Islam” has existed for centuries in the Volga region alongside other faiths. As such, this problem cannot be considered as a narrow regional issue, especially when the strategic importance of the Volga region for Russia as a whole is taken into account.
Unlike the North Caucasus, the Volga region has not yet become a territory where suicide bombings, acts of sabotage, and military strikes are commonplace. Nevertheless, recent years have brought with them a number of very alarming signs. The Volga region today is markedly differ-ent from even a decade ago. How can the risks to the Volga region be minimized? Is it possible to prevent the “Dagestanization” of this crucially important area of Russia?
First, the Russian leadership needs to learn its lessons from the experience of instability in the North Caucasus. The Islamic rise in the Volga region cannot be controlled through military or police operations. Of course, radicals who overstep the bounds of the law must be held account-able. Still, any attempt to minimize the Islamist threat will be ineffective if it does not incorporate an understanding of social and ideological issues. The hard use of police power may help to bring down the temperature of the patient, so to speak, but it is insu_cient to treat the underlying disease itself. There are many examples in which the FSB and other authorities have managed to minimize the activity of underground groups in the North Caucasus, but as long as the social pre-conditions for radicalism still exist, it will inevitably reappear.
Second, policymakers should support policies that would strengthen traditional Russian Islam, which is linked to the history and culture of the country as a whole and the Volga region in particular. However, Russia’s leadership should not conflate these policies with the straightforward support of loyal Muslim structures like spiritual boards at the republican and territorial levels, nor with the support of narrowly focused lobbyists. Following such an approach would be potentially dangerous, as the interests of a small number of groups could end up driving the religious policy of the state. Moscow has to recognize the growing role of religion in the political and social life of the country, but it also needs to counter the radicals that provoke militant insurgency and instabil-ity. Thus, the focus should be on large-scale public, cultural projects in which the state does not subcontract its responsibilities to anyone and in which it remains the initiator of all key decisions affecting not only the religious but also the secular sphere. This should include education, espe-cially in the teaching of history and other humanities to emphasize cross-regional contacts not only within the VFD but also among different federal districts. It must also include active and consistent promotion of a pan-Russian, supra-ethnic political identity, a goal that all of Russia’s presidents have repeatedly proclaimed. Otherwise, any attempt to compete with those that pro-mote purely sectarian loyalties would certainly fail.
Third, it will require colossal effort to differentiate between terrorists and those who would be amenable to pledge their political loyalty to the state. It would be wrong to label all nono_cial-Muslim groups as “Islamist” or “terrorist organizations”. Regional opposition groups do exist, pri-marily focused on some local interests; these could be integrated into activities already underway within Russia’s legal and political framework.
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The important task for Russia is to engage in pragmatic cooperation with the West. Unlike the Caucasus, the Volga Federal District is to a much lesser extent involved in the international agenda. However, this status quo is likely to change quite soon, with the Volga region becoming increasingly important to a host of international actors. The opening of a NATO transit center in the region is already a reality. In 2013, more than 13,500 university athletes from 170 countries will visit Kazan for the 27th Summer Universiade, and in 2018 some cities in the region, such as Kazan, Samara, and Nizhny Novgorod, will host the games of the FIFA World Cup. These interna-tional sporting events will require a higher and much more professional level of security in a ter-ritory where Salafi radicals have the destabilization of the country as a whole as their goal. Indeed, these events will necessitate that Russia cooperate with its Western partners to ensure security. As such, the problem of confidence building will take on both global and regional dimensions. The United States, therefore, needs to embrace more realistic approaches to Russia’s state-controlled and selectively supportive religious policy. As for Russia, it needs to identify means of voluntary international religious cooperation and not treat all foreign clergy as spies. The most important task for both countries is information exchange. Recent experience in the VFD, as well as in the North Caucasus, has demonstrated that radicals like the Russian Talibs often wage their fight against both the United States and Russia. Without information exchange and pragmatic commu-nication, any cooperation between the two countries will be merely an exercise in rhetoric.
Finally, this initial investigation into the Islamic rise in the Volga region must be continued. Detailed field studies designed to understand the underlying motives of nono_cial and radical Muslims, as well as the reasons why they are unable to follow their religion within the framework of state-supported Islam, could fill in the gaps where scholars currently lack of adequate informa-tion. In-depth interviews with the regional experts, NGO representatives, and religious activists, including first and foremost those in nono_cial groups, will provide a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the current dynamics of Islam in the region.
32 |the rise of radical and nonofficial islamic groups in russia’s volga region
about the author
Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow in the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. He is an expert on the Caucasus, as well as Black Sea, regional security, nationalism, interethnic conflicts and de facto states in the post-Soviet area. His publications include several books and reports, 50 academic articles, and more than 400 press pieces. Recently published books and reports include De Facto States of the Post-Soviet Space: 20 years of State-Building (Institute for the Caucasus, 2012); The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier, with A. Kuchins and M. Malarkey (CSIS, 2011); Radical Islam in the North Caucasus (CSIS, 2010); The Turbulent Eurasia (Academia, 2010); The Big Caucasus: Consequences of the “Five Day War” (International Centre for Black Sea Stud-ies, 2009); and The Ethno-national and Religious Factors in the Social-political Life of the Caucasus Region (Moscow State University, 2005).
Markedonov graduated from Rostov-on-Don State University in 1995. He earned his doctoral degree in history at Rostov-on-Don State Pedagogical University in 1999. From 1996 to 1999, he was a lecturer in the History Department of Rostov-on-Don State Pedagogical University. From 1998 to 2001, he served as a senior fellow in the governor’s press service in the Rostov regional administration. From 2001 to 2010, he worked as head of the Interethnic Relations Group and deputy director at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. From 2006 to 2010, he also held teaching positions at the Russian State University for the Humanities, the Moscow State University, and the Diplomatic Academy.
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