Table 10: (USDOT, 2009) variables of HSR vision
The multiple-case study of France, Japan, and Germany will examine each case by answering the following set of questions:
1. Was each implementation deemed a success?
2. Did the case support the U.S. HSR mixed funding strategy?
3. Did the case have a regional implementation scheme?
4. Did the case support other transportation sectors?
5. Did the case develop transit-oriented development?
6. Did the case develop a mixed rail infrastructure?
Upon completion of the individual case studies, a triangulation, or cross-case analysis, will provide insight into how each case is alike or different from the United States plan. This section will combine the most important lessons by examining the same questions being examined in the separate case studies, allowing for a clear view on the most significant variables for a successful high-speed rail system. DOT has an implementation plan in which they feel will be successful both short-term and long-term; this multiple-case study will test the strength of the established plan on a comparative basis.
Finally, based on the outcome of the separate case studies and the cross-case analysis, a discussion on the lessons learned from each case study will be made to potentially strengthen the HSR plan and ensure the most cost-effective strategy. The questions and criteria examined in each case can be generalized to any other country that has implemented a high-speed system. Due to the length of time each HSR system has been operating, France, Japan, and Germany provide the strongest sample for analyses, allowing for the strongest multiple-case study to examine the strength of the US implementation plan. The evidence provided by various scholarly sources converging on similar conclusions about each country provide over-arching data with strong internal and external validity to help determine the degree of success for each case.
Findings
In this section the individual findings for each of the three cases will be presented. The findings will be structure using the six questions from the U.S. plan.
France: TGV
Background
The French high -speed rail system, deemed Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV), was opened in 1981 with the TGV Sud- Est. Arduin and Ni (2005) explain that the Sud-Est, linking Paris to Lyon, was the first high-speed rail system implemented in Europe. From 1981 to 2001, the TGV has expanded its system from one line to seven; adding the TGV Atlatique (1989), TGV Rhone-Alpes (1992), TGV Nord Europe (1993), TGV Paris interconnections (1996), TGV Mediteranee (2001), and TGV East (2007). Today, with all lines interconnected, the French TGV network totals approximately 962 miles (Albalate and Bel, 2010).
Three components of the TGV stand out when determining the degree of success the system has had: a highly flexible infrastructure system, incremental regional implementation in highly populated cities, and a mixed funding approach. Due to the versatility in design, the TGV is compatible with the existing conventional rail network; this has led to low construction costs and the connectivity to the UK, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy (Arduin and Ni, 2005). Also, the TGV dedicated lines were implemented at an incremental rate in city centers with high population density, assuring high ridership and low economic vulnerability.
The TGV is owned and operated by French National Railways (SNCF), the French state-owned railway company. The SNCF owns the TGV trains and stations; the
French Rail Network (RFF) owns the remaining infrastructure, including the railways. It is important to note that SNCF and RFF operate under non-federal budgets, displacing economic burden from the federal government. Eironline (1997) explains that the RFF was formed in response to passed legislation: splitting off operating activities from network development and maintenance. In addition to the undertaking of the formally SNCF railways, the RFF undertook the SNCF debt owed to the French government of about $27 billion USD (134.2 FRF). The SNCF pays the RFF for the use of the railway infrastructure, while the RFF uses the earned revenues to pay the owed debt to the French government. Overall, the French high-speed rail system is a government owned business; however separate railroad budgets from the governmental budget alleviates economic pressure, avoiding an economic over-burden on the French national budget. This system is affective in connecting France with the rest of the European Union at an extremely low construction cost of US$10 million per km (Arduin and Ni, 2005).
Question One: Was the implementation deemed a success?
Arduin and Ni (2005) state that since the first commissioning of the TGV in 1981, the traffic volume for the rail line has steadily increased as more TGV branches have been added over time. As of 2005, about 250,000 passengers take one of the 600 TGV trains running daily. The yearly traffic totals 90 million passengers. The sources of increased rail traffic are a result of passengers switching preferences from the air and road sectors to the TGV due to the shorter trip times, frequent services, high comfort, and competitive prices the TGV provides (p. 25). Table 11 shows both the continual increasing size the TGV traffic and passenger totals.
Table 11: (Arduin and Ni, 2005)
A second aspect contributing to the success of the French TGV is the implementation structure the SNCF chose. By choosing a mixed infrastructure system, large costs were avoiding, making the French TGV the cheapest implementation process of the other European Nations at US$10 million per kilometer. This concept will be addressed in further detail below.
A third important aspect that the TGV has been proven successful with is economic self-sufficiency. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) state that on an annual basis, 80 percent of TGV services break even or make profit. In 2008, a record breaking year, SNCF did so well that it paid a dividend of $190 million to French taxpayers. Transit-oriented development is a fourth factor that has played into the success of the TGV. Although this aspect will be further discussed below, it is important to point out that connectivity the TGV has provided to other transportation sectors (light-rail, air, etc.) and is a large contributing factor to the overall successfulness of the system.
The final and most important aspect to the successfulness of any transportation sector is safety. Even though it has an annual ridership of 48 million passengers, there has
never been a single passenger death due to an HSR accident in the 29 years of existence of the TGV. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) explain the reason for this safety success:
In France, TGV railcars are designed such that adjacent TGV cars rest atop a shared two-
axle connector, which decreases weight and increases speed, but also prevents the cars from dangerously jack-knifing during a collision as would a conventional train.
A combination of inexpensive implementation, high initial ridership that continued to increase over time, economic self-sufficiency, transit-oriented development, and a continual immaculate track record for safety are the main contributing factors as to why the French TGV has been deemed a success.
Question Two: Did this case support the USHSR funding approach?
Since 1981, SNCF has been the main source of finance for the TGV; however, government contributions have come into play due to the initial economic and social success that the first line, the TGV Sud-Est provided. Vickerman (1997) explains:
TGV Paris-Lyon was financed entirely by SNCF on the basis of an expected minimum 12% financial rate of return, which has in practice been surpassed. The success of TGV
Sud-Est in terms of both traffic and revenue generation confirmed the French view that high-speed rail was an appropriate solution and this led to an early decision in favor of TGV-Atlantique, with an explicit recognition of the regional development potential
which led to a 30% government contribution to construction costs.
The initial success of the first TGV line, financed entirely by SNCF, led to further governmental support and funding for continual TGV development.
In addition to the SNCF, the French Rail Network (RFF) has taken on a large part of the financial investment by taking ownership in the infrastructure after a 1997 legislation was passed stating the need of a separation between operating activities from network development and maintenance (Eironline, 1997). The RFF has also taken on the infrastructure debt SNCF has accumulated before the split in agencies occurred; this has
helped ease the relationship between the French government and the SNCF since the RFF makes debt payments to the government while collecting payments for infrastructure uses from the SNCF. In sum the original projects were primarily financed by SNCF; however, as time went on the RFF (both state owned companies) and smaller portions by the French government became contributing factors.
The most recent project (TGV East), finished in 2007, was the first infrastructure project of its kind to be declared a public utility by the Ministry of the Environment; therefore, it is the first project to be primarily financed by the French regional governments and the European Union (EU). Arduin and Ni (2009) state that the total cost of the project was about US1.20 billion and was appropriated as follows: 61% public funds (French government, local authorities, EU, and Luxembourg); 17% RFF, and 22% SNCF. As HSR has expanded vastly beyond the borders of France, the EU has become more supportive of further developing the clean technology for the goal of enhanced HSR connectivity throughout the union.
When comparing the French funding approach to the United States, there are definite similarities in terms of mixed funding. SNCF and RFF are comparable to the US enterprises/regions that would be applying for grants and cooperative agreements. A connection exists between the processes of federal appropriation of funds after an initial financial investment is made from the smaller entities. The major difference in funding between the US and France lies in the fact that the United States does not have a further governing entity such as the European Union that could allocate further funding; therefore, it is crucial that the applying US regions be fully reviewed and deemed qualified before federal funding is allocated. The sheer size of the United States
compared to France makes the funding process a more tightly strung process with an increased margin for error, requiring a more comprehensive precautionary process when selecting regions.
Question Three: Did this case have a regional implementation scheme? France developed their TGV high-speed network with a clear regional
implementation strategy. In fact, the different TGV lines are named after the regions they were implemented: TGV Sud-Est (1981), TGV Atlatique (1989), TGV Rhone-Alpes (1992), TGV Nord Europe (1993), TGV Paris interconnections (1996), TGV Mediteranee (2001), and TGV East (2007) (Arduin and Ni, 2005). Table 12 gives an illustration of where and when each regional line was implemented throughout the country.
Table 12: (Arduin and Ni, 2005)
France not only developed their high-speed system on an incremental, regional basis; they also developed it in only highly populated cities, all based around Paris.
Albalate and Bel (2010) explain the motives behind the implementation strategy by stating:
Routes have to be established between the most highly populated centers so as to ensure satisfactory occupancy rates and to guarantee that the service can break even, particularly in light of high construction and operation costs. This is the case in France, where HST
lines are centered on Paris to reflect the country’s strong political, economic and demographic centralization.
By developing the TGV incrementally, based around each regions population centered on Paris, the SNCF was able to keep production costs low with a high degree of economic return. If the TGV were developed all at once, the initial production cost would have been too high to be fully developed. By starting on a regional level, the SNCF was able to prove to the French government, other local regions, and the European Union that high-speed rail is a viable and economically advantageous investment that could be developed in around other regional centers.
A distinct similarity exists between the French implementation strategy and the US proposed strategy. The United States is proposing to implement HSR at an initial regional level based around highly populated centers and only at the 100-600 mile level. This is similar to the French strategy in that there is no initial attempt to connect they entire country at once. As stated above, the geographic size of the United States compared to France provides the greatest difference between the two. It is even more vital for the US to develop HSR on a regional basis for multiple reasons, which will be discussed more in the cross-case analysis. In sum there are many similarities between the French regional implementation strategy and the proposed US strategy; due to the successfulness of the TGV, strong merit subsists for these similarities.
Question Four: Did this case support other transportation sectors?
From 1981 on, the implementation of the TGV in France has led to a direct decrease in both plane and car travel. High-speed rail travel has resulted in a displacement of both plane and car travel at the intermediate level. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) illustrate this trend by stating:
The success of high-speed rail in diverting passengers from planes was demonstrated
early on with the completion of the high- speed TGV rail line from Paris to Lyon in 1981. Before completion of the TGV, 31 percent of travelers from Paris to Lyon traveled by airplane. Following completion of the TGV, the air passenger share dwindled to 7
percent. The number of people traveling by air or rail between Paris and the region increased by 25 percent between 1996 and 2003, but the number of air passengers actually declined. All of the travel growth was accommodated via rail travel, which
increased its share of the air-rail market from 39 percent before the TGV to 58 percent afterward.
Furthermore, between 1981 and 1984, the amount of car travel between Paris and Lyon (TGV Sud-Est) decreased from 28% to 21% (Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva, 2010).
One of the main advantages of the resulting trend after the introduction of HSR comes in terms of energy efficiency and carbon emissions. Tables 13 and 14 show the amount of energy and carbon emissions that are saved when comparing train travel to air and auto (Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva, 2010).
