Categories of Performatives
Seminar 3. Performative Utterance
Issues Discussed:
1. Origin of the term
2. J. L. Austin’s definition
3. Categories of performatives
4. The “hereby” test
5. Distinguishing performatives from other utterances
6. Are performatives truth-evaluable?
7. E. Sedgwick’s account on performatives
8. Some examples (mainly of explicit performative utterances)
The notion of performative utterances was introduced by J. L. Austin. According to his original conception, it is a sentence which is not true or false but instead 'happy' or 'unhappy', and which is uttered in the performance of an illocutionary act, rather than used to state something (Austin originally assumed that stating something and performing an illocutionary act are mutually exclusive) [2].
Origin of the Term
Although Austin had already used the term in his 1946 paper "Other minds", today's usage goes back to his later, remarkedly different exposition of the notion in the 1955 William James lecture series, subsequently published as “How to Do Things with Words”. The starting point of the lectures is Austin's doubt against a widespread philosophical prejudice, namely, the implicit presumption that utterances always "describe" or "constate" something and are thus always true or false. After mentioning several examples of sentences which are not so used, and not truth-evaluable (among them non-sensical sentences, interrogatives, directives and "ethical" propositions), he introduces "performative" sentences as another instance.
J. L. Austin's Definition
In order to define performatives, Austin refers to those sentences which conform to the old prejudice in that they are used to describe or constate something, and which thus are true or false; and he calls such sentences "constatives". In contrast to them, Austin defines "performatives" as follows:
· Performative utterances are not true or false, that is, not truth-evaluable; instead when something is wrong with them then they are "happy" or "unhappy".
· The uttering of a performative is, or is part of, the doing of a certain kind of action (Austin later deals with them under the name illocutionary acts), the performance of which, again, would not normally be described as just "saying" or "describing" something [2, p. 5].
For example, when Peter says: "I promise to do the dishes" in an appropriate context then he thereby does not just say something, and in particular he does not just describe what he is doing; rather, in making the utterance he performs the promise; since promising is an illocutionary act, the utterance is thus a performative utterance. If Peter utters the sentence without the intention to keep the promise, or if eventually he does not keep it, then although something is not in order with the utterance, the problem is not that the sentence is false: it is rather "unhappy", or "infelicitous", as Austin also says in his discussion of so-called felicity conditions. In the absence of any such flaw, on the other hand, the utterance is to be assessed as "happy" or "felicitous", rather than as "true".
The initial examples of performative sentences Austin gives are these:
^ “I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)” – as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony.
^ “I name this ship the ‘Queen Elizabeth’.”
^ “I give and bequeath my watch to my brother” – as occurring in a will.
^ “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow” [2, p. 5].
As Austin later notices himself, these examples belong (more or less strikingly) to what Austin calls, explicit performatives; to utter an "explicit" performative sentence is to make explicit what act one is performing. However, there are also "implicit", "primitive", or "inexplicit" performatives. When, for instance, one uses the word "Go!" in order to command someone to leave the room then this utterance is part of the performance of a command; and the sentence, according to Austin, is neither true nor false; hence the sentence is a performative; –still, it is not an explicit performative, for it does not make explicit that the act the speaker is performing is a command.
As Austin observes, the acts purported to be performed by performative utterances may be socially contested. For instance, "I divorce you", said three times by a man to his wife, may be accepted to constitute a divorce by some, but not by others.
Categories of Performatives
Performatives are speech acts of a special kind where the utterance of the right words by the right person in the right situation effectively is (or accomplishes) the social act. In some cases, the speech must be accompanied by a ceremonial or ritual action. Whether the speaker in fact has the social or legal (or other kind of) standing to accomplish the act depends on some things beyond the mere speaking of the words. These are felicity conditions, which we can also explain by the “hereby” test. But let’s look, first, at some examples.
In the Acts of the Apostles (Chapter 19, verses 13-20) we read of some exorcists in Ephesus who tried to copy St. Paul and cast out evil spirits in the name of Jesus: “I adjure you by the Jesus whom Paul proclaims”. On one occasion the possessed man (or the evil spirit) attacked them, and said: “Jesus I know and Paul I know; but who are you?” Evidently St. Paul not only knew the words, but also had the means to call on divine aid for his exorcisms.
In a slightly similar vein, Claudius, in Hamlet, sees that his prayer is ineffectual because “Words without thoughts never to Heaven go”.
Outside of miracle or magic, there are social realities that can be enacted by speech, because we all accept the status of the speaker in the appropriate situation.
Here are some examples from different spheres of human activity, where performatives are found at work. These are loose categories, and many performatives belong to more than one of them:
x Universities and schools: conferring of degrees, rusticating or excluding students.
x The church:baptizing, confirming, marrying, funeral service, exorcism, commination (cursing) and excommunication.
x Governance and civic life: crowning of monarchs, dissolution of Parliament, passing legislation, awarding honours, ennobling or decorating.
x The law: enacting or enforcing of various judgements, passing sentence, swearing oaths and plighting one’s troth.
x The armed services: signing on, giving an order to attack, retreat or open fire.
x Sport: cautioning or sending off players, giving players out, appealing for a dismissal or declaring (closing an innings) in cricket.
x Business: hiring and firing, establishing a verbal contract, naming a ship.
x Gaming: placing a bet, raising the stakes in poker.
The “Hereby” Test
One simple but crude way to decide whether a speech act is of such a kind that we can aptly call it a performative is to insert the word “hereby” between subject and verb. If the resulting utterance makes sense, then the speech act is probably a performative. For example:
^ “I hereby confer upon you the honourable degree of Bachelor of Arts…”
^ “I hereby sentence you to three months’ probation, suspended for a year…”
^ “I hereby appoint you Grandmaster of the Ancient, Scandalous and Disreputable Order of Friends of the Hellfire Club …”
It is crude, because it implies at least one felicity condition – whatever it is to which “hereby” refers. In the first example, “hereby” may refer to a physical action (touching on the head or shoulder with a ceremonial staff or mace, say). In the second example it may refer to the speaker’s situation – in sitting as chairman of the bench of magistrates. The third example is a (plausible) invention – showing how all sorts of private groups (Freemasons, Rotarians, even the school Parent Teacher Association) can have their own agreements, which give to some speakers the power to enact performatives.