Relations with the Kremlin
In fact, in the Volga region there still has not been any experience comparable to the creation of a de facto independent Chechen state (1991–1994 and 1996–1999) or of the permanent extensive
terrorist network of the “Caucasus Emirate.” Admittedly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the situ-ation in Tatarstan—as in many other autonomous republics within the former Soviet Union—was tense. Many autonomous republics that had existed alongside the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic tried to gain independence, just as former Soviet republics such as the Central Asian and Baltic states had done before them. In the case of Tatarstan, the people first tried to raise their po-litical and legal status to that of a Soviet republic. Then they began to hold referenda showing sup-port for sovereignty. In the March 21, 1992, referendum on the republic’s sovereignty, 62 percent favored the status of a republic as a subject of international law. Ten days later, Tatarstan refused
to sign a federal treaty with Moscow and in December 1993, it chose not to participate in Russia’s first parliamentary elections or the referendum on the Russian Constitution.
14. Jadidism was an intellectual and religious movement especially popular among the Turkic people of the Russian Empire at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. This modernist trend maintained that Muslims in Russia had entered a period of decay that could only be rectified by the acquisition of a new kind of knowledge and comprehension of European-modeled political culture—that is, liberalism, or socialism. Jadids promoted discussion and reflections on Tatar ethno-national as well as pan-Turkic identity. In today’s Tatarstan, Jadidist ideas are interpreted in the context of “Euro-Islam.”
15. After the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 and then during the Civil War, Tatar nationalists attempted to establish an independent republic (the Idel-Ural State) but this project was not realized. The Tatarstan Constitution of 1992 defined Tatarstan as a sovereign state, but according to the constitutional amendments of 2002 (articles 1 and 3) Tatarstan is defined as a part of the Russian Federation.
16. Aleksei Malashenko, “Dva nepohozih Rennesansa” [The two different Renaissances], Otechestvennye zapiski [The Domestic notes] 5, 2003.
17. “Russia and Islam: The end of peaceful coexistence?” The Economist, September 1, 2012, http:// www.economist.com/node/21561947.
6 |the rise of radical and nonofficial islamic groups in russia’s volga region
Despite these tensions, Moscow and Kazan managed to avoid interethnic conflict. The Rus-sians who lived in Tatarstan did not flee en masse and many of them were incorporated into the republic’s elite. For years Tatarstan served as a political and managerial model for Russia’s other regions. Beginning with Tatarstan in 1994, Moscow launched its “treaty federation” model, which was predicated on compromise and utilizing special agreements between the country’s center and the regions; in the 1990s, Moscow signed 46 such treaties. During the two Chechen campaigns, journalists and experts often pointed to Tatarstan—a region with a complex ethnic composition that had found a way to avoid an armed confrontation with Moscow—as a counterexample to
the outcome in Chechnya. The latest demarcation treaty between Moscow and Kazan, ratified on June 24, 2007, excluded such points as “the sovereignty of Tatarstan,” although Kazan did retain the right to decide, jointly with Moscow, questions concerning the development of the republic’s natural resources.
For the Kremlin, Bashkortostan’s demands were also complicated puzzles. In the struggle to preserve particular preferences for the republic’s elite, Bashkir leader Murtaza Rakhimov em-braced a policy of “soft nationalism.” Unlike the leadership in Tatarstan, he did not entertain the possibility of statehood outside Russia. Right from the start Bashkir “nationalism” was more
grounded and orderly. In August 1994, Moscow and Ufa signed an agreement clarifying jurisdic-tional subjects and powers. This neat resolution of the ethnic factor and regional independence made Rakhimov successful until his resignation in 2010.
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Moreover, the Volga region produced such potentially attractive concepts as “Euro-Islam,” which aimed to develop the religion in accordance with contemporary realities and interreligious dialogue. According to Rafael Khakimov, a former advisor to Shaimiev and an active promoter of this idea,
The Tatar version of Islam is very pragmatic, yet at the same time it is not superficial, since it is based on an advanced system of religious and secular education. It manages to organi-cally unite Muslim values with the ideas of liberalism and democracy, and therefore it
can be called “Euro-Islam.” Tatars over a long period of proximity and engagement have been able to find many forms of coexistence with other ethnic groups, such as Catholics in Poland, Protestants in the Baltic countries, Orthodox Christians in Russia and traditional
18. Mintimer Shaimiev, “Ya vzyal otvetstvennost’ na sebya” [I put responsibility on myself], Moskovskiy Komsomolets, April 29, 2005.
19. Mihail Tul’skiy, “Wahhabity v Rossii pobezhdayut umerennyh musul’man?” [Do Wahhabis win the moderate Muslims in Russia?], Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 19, 2001.
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Islam in Central Asia. The whole way of life of the Tatars is a kind of dialogue with other civilizations, and this experience can be used to strengthen contacts between East and West, Russia and Asia.20
Indeed, in the VFD there are tens of thousands of examples of tolerance and respect for ethnic and religious feelings in individuals’ daily practice, more than would fill a multi-volume report.
It is also true that the number of Islamic radicals in the district is relatively small; the number is estimated from some hundreds to three thousand. Overall, the VFD government and law enforce-ment agencies have been able to control the situation within their jurisdictions.